{"id":57437,"date":"2024-05-17T17:23:00","date_gmt":"2024-05-17T17:23:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.dinsmore.com\/?post_type=publications&p=57437"},"modified":"2025-12-16T19:01:27","modified_gmt":"2025-12-16T19:01:27","slug":"one-less-arrow-in-defense-counsels-quiver-personal-jurisdiction-in-the-first-circuit-after-ford-motor-company","status":"publish","type":"publications","link":"https:\/\/www.dinsmore.com\/publications\/one-less-arrow-in-defense-counsels-quiver-personal-jurisdiction-in-the-first-circuit-after-ford-motor-company\/","title":{"rendered":"One Less Arrow in Defense Counsel\u2019s Quiver: Personal Jurisdiction in the First Circuit After Ford Motor Company"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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Did the United States Supreme Court upend specific jurisdiction in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court<\/em><\/a>, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)? Not quite. But the Court did rule for the first time that due process does not require a causal link between the defendant\u2019s activities in the forum and the alleged injury to the plaintiff. This case calls into question decades of precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit suggesting otherwise. Since Ford<\/em>, however, First Circuit district courts have continued to cite older cases, sometimes for propositions that now appear tenuous. The First Circuit, moreover, has yet to clarify what Ford <\/em>means for its earlier cases. Until it does, defense counsel should tread carefully when citing pre-Ford <\/em>cases in personal jurisdiction motion practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Personal Jurisdiction Before Ford<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The constitutional analysis for specific personal jurisdiction has three well-established prongs: relatedness; purposeful availment; and reasonableness.1<\/sup> The relatedness prong focuses on the nexus between the defendant\u2019s activities in the forum and the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action. As courts often put it, claims must \u201carise out of or relate to\u201d the defendant\u2019s conduct in the forum.  See, e.g.,<\/em>Sawtelle v. Farrell<\/em><\/a>, 70 F.3d 1381, 1388-89 (1st Cir. 1995).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For many years, First Circuit precedent suggested that, in personal injury cases, causation was a per se<\/em> element of relatedness.2<\/sup> In a seminal case, Nowak v. Tak How Investments Ltd<\/em><\/a>.<\/em>, the court explained that relatedness \u201censures that the element of causation remains in the forefront of the due process investigation.\u201d 94 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). This emphasis on causation, the court observed, was widely shared among federal courts. But courts differed on \u201cthe proper causative threshold, gravitating, in most cases, towards one of two causation tests: \u2018but for\u2019 or proximate cause.\u201d Id.<\/em> The court ultimately decided that \u201cthe proximate cause standard better comports with the relatedness inquiry because it so easily correlates to foreseeability.\u201d Id.<\/em> at 715. The court in Nowak<\/em> recognized a \u201cnarrow exception to the proximate cause test\u201d when a foreign corporation targets residents of a given forum to further a business relationship there, and those \u201cefforts lead to a tortious result.\u201d Id.<\/em> at 716. The court described this exception as \u201ca small overlay of \u2018but for\u2019 on \u2018proximate cause.\u2019\u201d Id.<\/em> Later cases reaffirmed that \u201cdue process demands something like a \u2018proximate cause\u2019 nexus.\u201d Harlow v. Children\u2019s Hosp.<\/em><\/a>, 432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H & Co. Kg.<\/em>, 295 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2002)). These cases left little room for doubt that some <\/em>causation was required, even if the standard was flexible in some circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This flexibility left ample room for advocacy. For example, imagine you represent a global automobile manufacturer in a pre-Ford<\/em>\u00a0products liability case. The plaintiff sued in the federal district where she lives and was injured by the vehicle your client designed, manufactured, and sold. Your client advertises and sells many vehicles\u2014including the allegedly defective model involved in the accident\u2014in that same district. But your client is neither incorporated nor headquartered there, and the vehicle that injured the plaintiff was designed, manufactured, and purchased in a different district. On these facts, you might have a specific personal jurisdiction defense: the complaint does not draw a sufficient causal link between your client\u2019s general business activities in the forum and the plaintiff\u2019s injury. Plaintiff\u2019s counsel might counter that \u201cbut for\u201d your client\u2019s presence in the forum, and the assumed brand awareness arising from that presence, the subject vehicle likely would not have ended up there. No matter. You have at your disposal First Circuit cases suggesting that due process demands a much stronger causal link\u2014something approaching proximate cause\u2014between your client\u2019s forum activities and the alleged injuries.\u00a0See<\/em>,\u00a0e.g<\/em>.,Harlow<\/em>, 432 F.3d at 61 (\u201cA broad \u2018but-for\u2019 argument is generally insufficient. . . . [D]ue process demands something like a \u2018proximate cause\u2019 nexus.\u201d);\u00a0United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp.<\/em>, 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir. 1992) (\u201cWe have likewise suggested an analogy between the relatedness requirement and the binary concept of causation in tort law under which both elements\u2014cause in fact . . . and legal cause\u2014must be satisfied to find causation sufficient to support specific jurisdiction.\u201d);\u00a0see also Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd.<\/em>, 295 F.3d at 65 (noting that \u201cbut for\u201d events can be \u201cvery remote,\u201d and assuming that due process requires \u201csomething like\u201d proximate case);\u00a0Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American Bar Ass\u2019n<\/em>,<\/a>\u00a0142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (\u201c[O]ur relatedness analysis thus focuses on causation.\u201d). With these cases, you might have had a shot at dismissal on personal jurisdiction grounds. But probably not after\u00a0Ford<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Supreme Court\u2019s Decision in Ford<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ford <\/em>involved the same basic scenario presented above: a global automotive company sought dismissal, on personal jurisdiction grounds, of products liability claims involving vehicles purchased outside the forums where the plaintiffs lived and were injured. The defendant conceded purposeful availment, but maintained that, because the vehicles were designed, manufactured, and purchased outside the forums, the plaintiffs could not satisfy the relatedness prong. Ford Motor Co.<\/em>, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Parsing the oft-repeated formulation of that inquiry\u2014that the injuries must \u201carise out of or relate to\u201d the forum conduct\u2014the Court observed that, while the first half of the phrase required causation, the latter half \u201ccontemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.\u201d Id<\/em>. Accordingly, the Court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument for an \u201cexclusively causal test of connection.\u201d Id.<\/em> at 1026, 1029. The Court cautioned, \u201cthe phrase \u2018relate to\u2019 incorporates real limits.\u201d Id.<\/em> at 1026. But as a concurring opinion pointed out, see id.<\/em>at 1033-34 (Alito, J., concurring), the Court declined to articulate those limits, suggesting only that a \u201cstrong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation\u201d would suffice. Id.<\/em> at 1026 (quotations omitted).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Compare Ford<\/em> with First Circuit precedent. Nowak <\/em>recognized a \u201cnarrow exception to the proximate cause test,\u201d but one that still required a causal showing, i.e., \u201ca small overlay of \u2018but for\u2019 on \u2018proximate cause.\u2019\u201d Nowak<\/em>, 94 F.3d at 716. And Harlow <\/em>reaffirmed that \u201cdue process demands something like a \u2018proximate cause\u2019 nexus.\u201d See Harlow<\/em>, 432 F.3d at 61. But Ford<\/em> held that \u201csome relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.\u201d Ford Motor Co.<\/em>, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. It is hard to see how Nowak <\/em>or Harlow <\/em>would support jurisdiction in that circumstance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First Circuit Personal Jurisdiction Decisions After Ford<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since Ford<\/em>, First Circuit courts have dismissed claims on grounds that resemble the sort of \u201cexclusively causal test of connection\u201d that Ford <\/em>rejected. In Ching-Yi Lin v. TipRanks, Ltd.<\/em><\/a>, 19 F.4th 28 (1st Cir. 2021), the First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a defamation claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant\u2019s in-state conduct was the \u201ccause in fact\u201d and \u201clegal cause\u201d of her injuries. Id.<\/em>at 35-36, 41. Likewise, in Vargas-Santos v. Sam\u2019s West, Inc.<\/em><\/a>, No. 20-1641 (GAG), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196736 (D.P.R. Oct. 12, 2021), the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico dismissed employment claims because, while the alleged facts satisfied a \u201cbut for\u201d standard of relatedness, they fell short of \u201csomething more akin to proximate cause,\u201d which the court said was \u201crequired\u201d in the First Circuit. Id.<\/em> at *10. Both cases relied on pre-Ford <\/em>cases without citing Ford<\/em>, much less discussing it.3<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two district courts have commented, in passing, that Ford <\/em>aligns with First Circuit precedent. In one case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts cited Nowak <\/em>and Harlow <\/em>to suggest that \u201cFord Motor Co.<\/em>\u202fis consistent with First Circuit precedent, which recognizes that while its presence or absence is important, causation is not a per se requirement of specific jurisdiction.\u201d\u202fSee Adams v. Gissell<\/em>, No. 20-11366-PBS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126712, at *21 n.13 (D. Mass. May 24, 2021). But neither Nowak <\/em>nor Harlow<\/em> said exactly that. Nowak <\/em>allowed a \u201cslight loosening\u201d of the proximate cause standard in a specific factual circumstance, but the relationship found in that case to satisfy relatedness was still causal in nature\u2014i.e., a \u201csmall overlay of \u2018but for\u2019 on \u2018proximate cause.\u2019\u201d Nowak<\/em>, 94 F.3d at 715-17. Along similar lines, Harlow<\/em> reaffirmed that \u201ccausation is central to the relatedness inquiry\u201d and nowhere suggested that a non-causal relationship would satisfy First Circuit precedent. Harlow<\/em>, 432 F.3d at 61. The same is true of Nandjou v. Marriott International, Inc.<\/em><\/a>, 985 F.3d 135 (1st. Cir. 2021), a decision that preceded Ford <\/em>by two months, and which the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire cited to support its observation that First Circuit \u201cprecedent is consistent with [Ford<\/em>].\u201d See<\/em>O\u2019Neil v. Somatics, LLC<\/em><\/a>, No. 20-CV-175-PB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183730, at *10 (D.N.H. Sept. 24, 2021). Nandjou<\/em> went no further than Nowak<\/em>, recognizing only that, in some circumstances, strict adherence to proximate cause is inappropriate. Nandjou<\/em>, 985 F.3d at 149-50.4<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nowak<\/em> and its progeny are best understood not as rejecting \u201ccausation-only,\u201d as Ford <\/em>did, but as recognizing that sometimes the proper causative threshold lies closer to \u201cbut for\u201d than proximate cause. See<\/em> Anderson v. Century Prods. Co.<\/em><\/a>, 943 F. Supp. 137, 142 (D.N.H. 1996). The same cannot be said of Ford<\/em>, which made clear that relatedness can mean a causal relation, but it can also mean an \u201caffiliation,\u201d \u201crelationship,\u201d or \u201cconnection.\u201d Ford Motor Co.<\/em>, 141 S. Ct. at 1035 (Alito J., concurring).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The First Circuit recently acknowledged as much, but still did not reconcile Ford<\/em> with circuit precedent. In Cappello v. Rest. Depot, LLC<\/em><\/a>, 89 F.4th 238 (1st Cir. 2023), a New Hampshire resident ate a contaminated salad in New Jersey and then sued, in his home state, companies involved in the distribution and sale of the salad. Id.<\/em>at 241. In some respects, the facts in Cappello<\/em> paralleled Ford<\/em>: both companies did business in the forum, but the particular instrumentality of harm was sold elsewhere. Seizing on Ford<\/em>, the plaintiff argued that his claims were related to the defendants\u2019 business contacts in New Hampshire because the product that allegedly caused him harm was of the type that the defendant sold in the forum state. Id.<\/em> at 245. The First Circuit disagreed. Acknowledging Ford<\/em>\u2019s rejection of \u201ccausation only,\u201d the court nonetheless found that the business contacts at issue concerning produce were inherently different in nature and scale than those at issue in Ford<\/em>, which involved the nationwide manufacture and retail sale of automobiles. Id.<\/em>at 245-47. The plaintiff thus did not satisfy Ford<\/em>\u2019s broader relatedness standard. In so ruling, the Cappello<\/em> court did not discuss whether or how its earlier precedent aligns with the new, broader standard established by Ford<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Accordingly, even after Cappello<\/em> it remains true that \u201cthe First Circuit has yet to address what\u202fFord Motor Co.<\/em>\u202fmeans for the test articulated in\u202fHarlow<\/em>.\u201d Levesque v. Iberdrola, S.A.<\/em><\/a>, No.\u202f2:19-cv-00389-JDL, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147847, at *22 n.5 (D. Me. Aug. 6, 2021). For now, it is safe to assume that Ford <\/em>means something <\/em>for the tests articulated in First Circuit precedent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Practical Impact for First Circuit Practitioners<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Until the First Circuit provides further guidance, counsel should be wary of relying on cases like Nowak<\/em> and Harlow<\/em>. Those cases could easily be used to craft a \u201ccausation-only\u201d argument that Ford <\/em>expressly rejected. Indeed, the Court in Ford<\/em> observed that \u201c[n]one of our precedents has suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant\u2019s in-state activity and the litigation will do.\u201d 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Accordingly, when challenging personal jurisdiction, defense counsel should avoid forming arguments that suggest causation is necessarily required to establish relatedness. That is no longer the law of the land, even if no First Circuit case has said as much.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n
    \n
  1. See<\/em>Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr<\/em><\/a>.<\/em>, 530 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 2008); see also<\/em>U.S. Const. amend. XIV (due process).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
      \n
    1. See Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American Bar Ass\u2019n<\/em>, 142 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (\u201c[In] a tort claim, we customarily look to whether the plaintiff has established cause in fact (i.e., the injury would not have occurred \u2018but for\u2019 the defendant\u2019s forum-state activity) and legal cause (i.e., the defendant\u2019s in-state conduct gave birth to the cause of action).\u201d (cleaned up)); Old United Cas. Co. v. Flowers Boatworks<\/em>, No. 2:15-CV-43-DBH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58430, at *9-10 (D. Me. May 3, 2016) (\u201cThe claims . . . constitute a conventional\u202fproducts liability\u202fcase, and I treat the claims as tort claims.\u202f. . . For tort claims, I must probe the causal\u202f<\/strong>nexus between the defendant\u2019s contacts and the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action.\u201d (cleaned up)).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n
        \n
      1. Two other recent decisions from the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts cited pre-Ford<\/em>cases to suggest that causation is central to relatedness, but neither case turned on the relatedness element. See<\/em> Sheldon v. DT Swiss AG<\/em><\/a>, No. 1:22-cv-11198-IT, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169108, at *32 (D. Mass. Sept. 22, 2023); SV Athena, LLC v. B&G Mgmt. Servs.<\/em><\/a>, 671 F. Supp. 3d 77, 83 (D. Mass. 2023).<\/li>\n\n\n\n
      2. In another case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts recognized that \u201c[i]n Ford<\/em>, the Supreme Court held that a causal showing is not necessary\u201d for relatedness. See<\/em> Alves v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.<\/em><\/a>, No. 22-11820-WGY, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127323, at *16 n.2 (D. Mass. July 24, 2023). But the Court found no occasion to comment further on the effect of Ford<\/em>on earlier circuit precedent, reasoning that Ford<\/em> was inapplicable to the internet-based contract and economic injuries at issue.  Id.<\/em><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

        Did the United States Supreme Court upend specific jurisdiction in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021)? Not quite. 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